A systems analysis of earthquake hazards in urban areas is carried out in relation to an issue of warning, in which the viewpoint from risk assessment is employed. Mass panic and systems panic are distinguished, and the latter is shown to be much more crucial than the former.
Urban Earthquake Hazards and Issue of Warning
In 1923, Tokyo was attacked by an earthquake of magnitude 7.8 and about 140 thousand people were lost. If a similar earthquake does occur again, hazards will not take the simple form because concentrations of administrative and economic activities in Japan are abnormally high. Estimated losses of life by the second Tokyo earthquake range from 20 thousands to 2 millions depending on the assumed conditions of weather, time of occurrence, etc. Many of the losses are caused by secondary induced regional fire and panic. The maximum estimated number of 2 million people are equivalent to 10% of the total population within the Tokyo metropolitan area (23 millions). Although the above number of losses is only 2% of the total population of Japan, the loss to the life-supporting system for the remaining 98% of population is serious. Essential characters of earthquake hazards at a densely populated area cannot be assessed by merely the absolute number of losses of life but rather by the gap between losses of life and that of the life-supporting system for the survivals (cf. SHIMAZU et al., 1970; SHIMAZU, 1975) . The Miyagi-Ken-Oki earthquake (M=7.4), which occurred 100km east of Sendai City (population=636,000) on June 12, 1978, resulted in shocks of intensity 5 (Japanese Meteorological Agency scale) to Sendai area. Characteristics of the damage were as follows:
(1) Both fires and direct collapse of buildings were relatively few. However, landslides in newly developed residential areas were significant.
(2) Injured people reached 1.7% of the total population, of which 97% were minor injuries. Half of the deaths were caused by the destruction of blocked cement walls.
(3) Supplies of electricity, city gas and water stopped for a long time, among which over one month was required to recover the gas supply. A paralysis in telephone lines also occurred.
(4) Computers and other electronic equipments became useless.
In conclusion, we may say that the functions for keeping the urban living level are paralyzed although there is only a slight fear of death. To maintain a safe and comfortable living level, we are surrounded by various service and utility systems as shown in Fig. 1 . The central part represents the minimum level for survival, which is surrounded by systems to maintain urban living. Here the new types of damage caused by the collapse of complex urban systems is called "urban earthquake hazards". From the citizens' side, separation of working and residential areas and the collapse of traditional customs in community life may amplify the urban earthquake hazards.
The existing hazards reduction program, in which the object is to reduce deaths caused by building damage and induced fire, does not include the consideration of the above circumstances in city areas. In other words, the existing program deals with the means of survival for an earthquake with intensity 6 or greater. According to The Large Scale Earthquake Countermeasure Act enforced in December, 1978, the areas to be observed should be specified, of which criteria are an expected intensity of 6 and 7 (cf. NATIONAL LAND AGENCY, 1978) . However, there are wider urban areas with an expected intensity of 5 around the specified areas. In addition, there may occur greater numbers of earthquakes with intensity 5. Therefore a hazards reduction program against urban earthquake hazards should be established.
Actual defects of the existing program are summarized as follows:
(1) Lack of a system view A large scale earthquake is equivalent to a simultaneous occurrence of regional fire, blackout, flood, explosion, traffic jam, etc. Therefore a simple integration of individual countermeasures is not sufficient, and complex service and utility systems should be protected.
(2) Too much hardware oriented It is true that the establishment of an earthquake proof city is necessary. However, it is not sufficiently adequate for the protection of a complex system. There exist four fundamental strategies to reduce the loss of the elements of a system.
(i) increase of strength so as to avoid being destroyed (ii) easy to restore (iii) dispersion of functions (iv) preparation of spare or substitute
An essential action to prevent a systems collapse is the protection of the information system which is classified into organizations (3) Demand-supply gap The existing program is established within administrative channels, and there often exists a gap with the citizens' demands. Examples are the demands for informations and the emergency evacuation as described afterward.
It is true that there exist few alternatives to survive, and the demand-supply gap is not essential. However, the demands to maintain urban living are complex, and the gap becomes significant. (4) Role of warning issue is not clear The Large Scale Earthquake Countermeasure Act is composed of two main subjects as identification of the area to be observed issue of warning and accompanied emergency actions The former corresponds to a long-term prediction while the latter to a prediction of which the lead time is several hours to a few days. At present, there exists no definite countermeasure after the warning is issued. It is remarked that actions (iii) and (iv) described in (2) are significantly effective if the warning issue is possible. Their running cost/initial cost is rather high (it is difficult to maintain the protection system for a long time) and consequently, the issue of warning is highly favorable for taking actions.
It is remarked that the issue of prediction (academic or scientific level) should be connected with the issue of warning (administrative or political level). Here, "academic or scientific" means the objective decision while "administrative or political" means the choice of alternatives. These two issues should have different evaluation criteria, and therefore, they should be intrinsically independent of each other (NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, U.S.A., 1975; International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, 1979) . However, we have no time for sequential decision makings of these two issues, and a serious interaction between academic research and political decision making process is required.
Process of warning issue is shown schematically in Fig. 2 . An intensive workshop by seismologists is called upon when abnormal data are detected at the Meteorological Agency (MA). It is expected that about one hour is required to assemble seismologists after the call. The information to the public must not be released earlier than 30 minutes after the call. Otherwise, the seismologists may be unable to come to MA due to an induced traffic jam. The decision reached by the seismologists is sent to the director of MA. Following his advice, the Prime Minister calls the cabinet council for the decision making, and the warning is issued. The warning is released to the public through two channels, i.e. mass media (broadcast by TV and radio) and administrative media (announcement by moving cars of public relations section at municipalities). Besides the above official communication, the information leak is expected to occur during the process of decision making. Is there any restriction to the timing and contents of issue for effective counter actions? The warning issue is distinguished from news issue because the former should include expected actions of the public. Here, the warning issue is regarded as a component in a risk assessment (RA) procedure. Characteristics of RA procedure are shown in Table 1 , where those of environmental assessment (EA) procedure are also shown for comparison (SHIMAZU and HIRAMATSU, 1978) . RA is more difficult than EA because (1) revision or feedback after issue is dangerous (2) case study or learning through experience is difficult (3) there exists information which cannot be released (status of security, etc.) (4) public participation is limited. Mass actions to predict earthquakes in China have a significance in relation to public participation or social learning. However, this approach is difficult to apply in Japan, which can be understood from the status for EA.
Generally, there exist two types of actions, i.e. programmed and expedient. The former is especially significant in relation to the warning issue. The actions which can be done by individuals are rather limited in such a systematized society. Even in the case of a fire, fire fighting by volunteers is not effective in urban areas and a professional fire department is required. The situation is much more severe in the case of a great earthquake. It is often appealed to that individuals should prepare for food and other articles for emergency. However, this appeal has significance only when a program to restore food circulation and supply systems is confirmed.
It is true that the behavior of individuals under abnormal situation are crucial for expedient actions. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that a collapse of systems is much more fatal for urban earthquake hazards. Here the panic expected to accompany an earthquake is classified into (A) systems panic caused by a system collapse (cf. SHIMAZU and HIRAMATSU, 1978, 1979; SUGIYAMA et al., 1978) , (B) mass panic caused by the behavior of individuals (cf. OHTA and ABE, 1977; INSTITUTE FOR JOURNALISM, 1979; TURNER et al., 1979) . Systems panic is more fundamental because it is a source of mass panic . In addition, systems panic is much more operational and consequently , the issue of warning should be primarily designed to prevent systems panic. Structure of earthquake hazards is schematically shown in Fig. 3 . It is seen that the existing program covers only a very small part of the whole problem.
In conclusion, the following three strategies are proposed to prevent systems panic based on the proposition that the warning can be issued just before the earthquake.
Reorganization into a simpler system (C)
Formation of multi-cell system complex Among them, (C) is realized by the establishment of a decision maker at community level. However, it appears to be difficult especially in urban areas where community activity is very low. Top down formation of self-defense organization at community level is rather dangerous as was experienced in the Tokyo earthquake of 1923, in which case a riot was generated rather than a panic being suppressed.
Diffusion of Information Observed in Shizuoka Prefecture and Timing of Warning Issue
On January 14, 1978, in Izu-Oshirna area, an earthquake with M=7.0 occurred. Afterwards, a warning for aftershocks was issued on January 18, which caused an unexpected panic. The event was surveyed by the INSTITUTE FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGY (1978) with respect to how the issue was propagated and deformed, how the warning was recognized and evaluated, and what types of response and action occurred.
Three modes of surveys were employed as shown in Table 2 . Telephone interviews were carried out as a preliminary survey one week after the event and afterwards a detailed mail inquiry was employed. The information and accompanying Fig. 4 .
The information propagation is expressed by a network model as shown in Fig. 5 The unit time interval is one hour, and the result of simulation is shown in Fig. 6 (1), where the dotted curve represents the estimated value for the case with no corrected issue. To reduce the discrepancy between Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 (1), let us assume that the rate of misunderstanding is reduced after the correction is issued, or Ti>Fi+1(1,10).
The result is shown in Fig. 6 (2), where the dotted curve represents the case for the corrected issue only. Next, a sensitivity analysis is carried out. One of the operational parameters is the contact rate of public broadcast. If it is raised from 30% to 80%, the result becomes Fig. 6 (3). We see that the effect is negative, i.e. an accompanying increase in misunderstood information disturbs the total situation. An increase in the contact rate of the announcement by administrative channels has a similar negative effect. In addition, the latter channel is liable to taro the quality through these gates, we need much more time. Confusion or panic results if the information through parallel channels has a time lag. If the rate of misunderstanding of public broadcast be reduced from 50% to 10%, we have Fig. 6(4 and they are consistent with each other by a time sharing switch. However, the above conformity collapses if a great earthquake occurs. Separation of family in residential and working areas and a paralysis in telephone lines to connect these two areas becomes a major source of panic. An interview inquiry was carried out by the INSTITUTE FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGY (1978) to obtain response of individuals to a warning issued just before a great earthquake; of which the mode of sampling is shown in Table 3 . The outline of the inquiry is described Table 3 . Modes of survey for responses of individuals when the warning is issued.
Interactions of behaviors are expressed by a network relational model as in Fig. 7 . The transition or selection probabilities of respective binary relations are summarized in Table 4 . Behaviors of "go home" and "phone call" are significant.
What are the evaluation criteria of warning issue from the view point of risk assessment?
It is generally argued that a success or failure of prediction is crucial.
However, the situation is not so simple in the existing case, because there exist five alternative cases as shown in Fig. 8 . In other words, a success or With respect to expressions of warning, "will occur after several hours from now" and "will occur within several hours from now" should be distinguished. The actual expression might be close to the latter, and there exists the possibility of occurrence of earthquake even just after the issue. Therefore, the time required for emergency action should be as short as possible.
Here the timing of warning issue is evaluated based on a simulation of interaction between Fig. 2 and Fig. 7 . A revised relational model simulator NESSY-III (see Appendix II) is employed, in which the switching of binary relations and the dynamic processing of loops are possible.
The functions of the NESSY-III are used for the following cases
(1) When the number of phone calls exceed the capacity, and alternative behaviors such as "go home" or "run away" are activated.
(2) When the numbers of people "on street" exceed the traffic capacity, and an alternative consequence such as "evacuation impossible" is activated.
(3) Transition or selection probability can be a function of step number or flow value.
(4) Generation of earthquake or completion of emergency action can be specified by a function of phase=20.
Dynamic simulation is carried out for the following cases:
(A) initial conditions (B) size of the system (C) time from "assemble seismologists" to "issue warning"=two hours i.e. time required to complete emergency actions by administrative officers +one hour (D) phone call capacity=20% at HOME, OFFICE and 10% on STREET traffic capacity=20% of the individuals on STREET ...., case for high traffic capacity (no collapse on street) (E) behaviors of individuals are referred to Table 4 .
Results of simulation are shown in Fig. 10 , where the unit time step is 10 minutes.
Simulations are started at the time of seismologists call and the warning is issued at step 12 (----in Fig. 10 ). Codes in Fig. 10 denote PH: ratio of persons who made phone calls to numbers of individuals at HOME, STREET, and OFFICE. OFFICE ONLY means that the phone call at office is possible. OS: individuals on street during the unit time increase (=go office+go home +run away). Evacuation is excluded. AH: individuals arriving at home during the unit time increase. AO: individuals arriving at office during the unit time increase. EV: accumulated numbers of evacuated individuals (=from home+from street+from office). The information leak is started at Step 0, in which the initial contact ratio and propagation probability are assumed as 0.1% and 40% (=40% of the contacted individuals desiring to communicate to others) respectively. The first leak in information reaches the office and then it is diffused within office and home. If the propagation probability becomes 50%, the telephone system is paralyzed before the official warning is issued.
After the warning is issued, the first collapse comes from a paralysis in telephone lines, especially on the street. Since the number of public telephones on the street are limited, almost all individuals fail to reach phones, and so they wish one hour of issue. The situation is much simpler in the case of night or a holiday. The time to reorganize the daytime system into the nighttime system (office, city, it is impossible to realize a reorganization because of phone call and traffic collapse.
therefore, reorganization of the home-street-office system into a simpler system of home (-office) might be one of the operational strategies to prevent a systems panic. Since three hours are required to reorganize a system for a medium size city, the warning should be issued at least three hours ahead. Additional time is needed for the issue process, among which the time to assemble seismologists is estimated as one hour. Therefore, the total time from the detection of an abnormal sign to an issue might be two hours or so. Thus, the detection of the abnormal sign should be several hours ahead of the earthquake occurrence, if possible. The longer the time from the assembly of seismologists to the issue, the more the risk of information leak increases. Reduction of time to assemble seismologists is crucial, or the technical prediction and evaluation should be done by the staffs within the Meteorological Agency who are in a state of stand-by for 24 hours. Moreover, the reorganized system cannot be maintained for a long time. In particular, it might be impossible to continue for two nights , and the maximum time duration from the warning issue to the occurrence should be at most one day. 
Mass Evacuation from a Downtown Area after a Warning Is Issued
The "go home" behavior will be especially prevailing for people in the downtown area of a large city. Here a simulation model is developed for mass actions after a warning is issued, of which a conceptual model is illustrated in Fig. 11 . Characteristics of the model are described as follows:
(A) Initial state people are classified into four groups as: (1) OFFICE=employees belonging to big companies and public offices which have obligations to formulate an emergency measure by the Act.
of their actions is possible, the dispersion will occur according to either individual behavioral differences or their locations at T=0 (=time of issue). They will prefer for evacuation the traffic which they use every day.
(2) DEPART=shoppers or visitors to department stores, supermarkets, theaters, etc., which have obligations to formulate an emergency measure by the Act (Hereafter department store will be abbreviated as DEPART). Process of issue and decision making are similar to OFFICE. However, the control of information and actions is not effectual, and the dispersion of behavior will be larger than that for OFFICE. TV sections in department stores would be a source of information. They are not familiar with either the inside or the outside of the buildings, and they will prefer for evacuation the traffic which they used to come.
(3) STREET=walkers on the street and shoppers at stores, coffee shops, etc. Modes of information transmission and actions are different from those for OFFICE and DEPART. The issue is reached through public broadcasting and the information is diffused. Action is started as soon as the information is reached. Therefore, a control is almost impossible. In addition, actions will be started by other's action without any understanding of the situation, and they are entangled with the mass flow. Here it is called an avalanche effect.
(4) SUBROAD=people on underground streets. Although the situation is similar to STREET, SUBROAD is distinguished from STREET because their modes of evacuation are different. They have little chance of contact with public broadcasting and the first issue will reach the security center, where the TV set is in a state of ON for 24 hours. Afterwards, the information is announced through the BGM (background music) system. The efficiency of the BGM system is not high, and the diffusion and avalanche effect will be prevailing.
Mode of action is shown schematically in Fig. 12 . Codes in Fig. 12 denote X: percentage of accumulated numbers of individuals who start their action. TI: time used for decision making. It is defined as a delay time to start action. XI: individuals who start their action at time TI. TF: time required for 90% of the total to finish their action (=TI+DTI). That is, three control variables, TI, XI and DTI, represent modes of information transmission, control of action and dispersion of action respectively.
Characteristics of information transmission and modes of action for four groups are summarized in Table 5 . Well-controlled actions (shown by curve A, with high XI and small DTI) and actions with no control (shown by curve B, with low XI and large DTI) correspond to the cases for OFFICE and SUBROAD respectively. becomes crowded, some people arriving at TERMINAL will change their minds to choose METRO or FOOT to evacuate.
(3) CAR=go to underground PARKING area and start cars to a street. The flux will decrease rapidly with increase in FOOT. If PARKING becomes crowded, some people will change their minds to choose METRO or FOOT to evacuate.
(4) METRO=go to a station through SUBROAD, pass through a wicket, enter a platform to wait, and catch a train. If PLATFORM becomes crowded, some people will change their minds to choose FOOT.
Interactions of mass actions after the warning is issued are expressed by a network relational model as Fig. 13 . As a case study, simulation is carried out for Sakae area in Nagoya City, where big companies, public offices, department stores, etc. are concentrated and constitutes a business, shopping and amusement center. A dynamic relational model simulator: NESSY-IV (see Appendix III) is employed for the simulation. Actions and evacuation methods for employees at big enterprises and department stores, after the warning is issued, are obtained through a questionnaire. In addition, means of transportation (subway, bus, car, etc.), traffic density and transport capacity around Sakae area are surveyed. Compiled results of questionnaires and traffic circumstances are shown as follows: Table 6 . Initial distribution at four areas. Table 7 . Selection probability for evacuation at four areas. Table 8 . Selection probability when BUS (CAR) or METRO is of no use . Table 9 . Critical flux and delay time.
(A) Initial distribution Three cases, i.e. simple case, weekday case and weekend case are considered. The total number of persons staying at Sakae area at 11:00 a.m. are estimated as 94,000 (weekday) and 100,000 (weekend and simple case), of which the classification (%) into four groups is shown in Table 6 .
(B) Selection probability Selection probability (%) for four means of evacuation are shown in Table 7 . In a case when BUS (CAR) or METRO is of no use, selection probabilities as shown in Table 8 are given from questionnaires.
(C) Critical flux and delay time are given as shown in Table 9 .
(D) Capacity of establishments is given as shown in Table 10 . (E) Critical flux and delay time for four modes of evacuation are given as shown in Table 11 . Delay time represents the time used for evacuation from Sakae area. Phase 1, 2 and 3 represent as follows: Table 11 . Critical flux (capita/min.) and delay time of Sakae area to four methods of evacuation. Here, parameters T1, T2 and T3 are given by input data of the NESSY-IV. (F) Modes of mass actions at four areas are given as shown in Table 12 .
(G) Time for decision making Time for decision making (TI) is one of the operational parameters, whose
For a sensitivity check, dynamic simulation is carried out for the following simple model.
Initial states at T=0 (time of warning issue) are defined as:
(1) People are classified into two groups as: ground (OFFICE+DEPART + STREET)=90,000 persons, underground (SUBROAD)=10,000 persons.
(2) Modes of evacuation are FOOT and METRO only. Table 14 . Results of simulation for the simple model.
(3) Speed of subway is reduced at T=30 minutes. (4) Actions at the underground start as soon as the warning issue is transmitted.
Results of simulation are shown in Table 14 , where the unit time step is one minute. From the result of simulation for the simple model, the following features are deduced.
(1) Delay time (TI) to start actions on the ground has little effect on the number of persons successfully evacuated by METRO, while the time to complete the evacuation becomes longer.
(2) In case A, only 9,000 persons are successful among 90,000 persons who intend to evacuate by METRO. It means that only persons staying at SUBROAD have evacuated successfully. The situation comes from the fact that the connection between the ground and underground is closed due to an overflow by the streams namely, entrance and exit will be abbreviated as the connection. Table 15 shows the results of simulation for three cases (METRO=90%, 50%, 10%) with no regulation at the connection, TI=20 minutes and the unit time step=one minute. SUB represents the number of persons locked in the underground. Longer the time from the start of action to the completion of evacuation, the more the number of persons locked in the underground increases. The above situation which is not easy to understand is explained as follows. Inflow to SUBROAD is easy at the early stage, and then the number of persons at PLAT-FORM increases rapidly. However, the flow by METRO is reduced rapidly and the people waiting change their minds to choose FOOT. Nevertheless, the connection was already blocked due to the overflow from the ground, and people are running about the underground street to look for an open connection. On the contrary, if the connection is closed at an early stage, most people are forced to choose FOOT and they evacuate successfully.
Next, detailed dynamic simulations concerned in the evacuation from Sakae area were carried out under the following conditions, of which the results are shown in Table 16. 1. Initial distribution: weekday and weekend in Table 6 . 2. Selection probability:
case A and B in Table 7 . 3. Selection probability when BUS (CAR) or METRO is of no use:
case no BUS (CAR) and no METRO in Table 8 . 4. Modes of mass actions at four areas: XI (%) and DTI (min.) in Table 12 . 5. Time for decision making (TI) which is given as an exogenous variable: Table 16 denotes the number of persons who are locked in a subroad.
It should be noticed that in case I of weekday A where the time for speed reduction of subways follows closely after the time for decision making at OFFICE and DEPART, about 170 persons are locked in a subroad due to an overflow by Increasing the interval between the time for decision making at OFFICE or DEPART and also that for speed reduction of subways, the number of persons Table 16 . Results of simulation for the evacuation from Sakae area in Nagoya City .
WEEKDAY-A who are successfully evacuated by the four means approaches a constant value, while, the time used to complete evacuation after the warning is issued becomes much longer. More than 50% of the people among those who intend to evacuate by METRO have failed to evacuate by METRO, and are forced to change their minds to choose FOOT, thereby 68,000 persons are eventually evacuated on FOOT. In the case of a weekend, more persons are successfully evacuated by METRO than in the case of a weekday. It means that on a weekend more persons are in SUB-ROAD than on a weekday.
The actual time for decision making (TI) will correspond to case V or VI in There will be hundreds of people who will return to the ground after entering into the underground. In case IV' of a weekday B with sufficient capacity at a connection, it will not be blocked at the early stage, and many people will flow in and out of the subroad. After a while the connection will be blocked due to an overflow by the more than 35,000 people will be locked in the subroad. However, people who have failed to enter into a subroad are able to evacuate on FOOT.
Countermeasures deduced from the simulation results are summarized as follows:
(1) Simultaneous rush to METRO from various areas should be avoided and a delayed start of actions at OFFICE, DEPART and SUBROAD is recommended. Actions on the ground should be started after successful actions at SUBROAD by FOOT and METRO.
(2) To realize (1), the information should be announced at SUBROAD as soon as possible. Slow decision making at a security center is unfavorable. The control of initiation of mass actions is rather easy, because there are no TV and radio sets at the shops.
(3) The time required for decision making at OFFICE and DEPART is another key factor. It should not be much less than the value in the existing program, i.e. 20-30 minutes. An additional time to reach the connection to underground is also required. Information leak, especially at DEPART should be avoided.
(4) Immediate regulation of speed of METRO is rather unfavorable towards avoiding an overflow at METRO. Modes of transmission of regulation order is important, and a simultaneous speed reduction of all trains is recommended.
(5) Public bus service should be stopped, because it has no significant role. Similarly, parking areas should be closed.
(6) Connections to undergrounds should not be closed, because it is useful in promoting evacuations from the underground. To close particular connections will make the situation worse; a mass panic will be started.
(7) In the case of evacuation from DEPART, it is important to control the wickets of subway should be set free to prevent panic.
In addition, the following three points should be remarked concerned in this simulation model:
additional time to reach home will be one or two hours on foot even for successful persons.
(2) Effects from the areas around Sakae are given as the external parameters. Especially, the interaction with Nagoya Station area, two stops from Sakae by subway, should be considered in greater detail.
(3) A detailed car traffic stream is not considered, and a proposal for traffic control is not given.
4. Systems Analysis of Hazards in the Miyagi-Ken-Oki Earthquake on June 12, 1978 1978. Systems analysis of the hazards was carried out from both demand and supply sides based on an inquiry survey which was made under the project sponsored by the Science and Technology Agency (INSTITUTE FOR POLICY SCIENCES, 1979) . The mode of sampling is as shown in Table 17 . Shiogama, National and Izumi are satellite cities around Sendai and the degrees of their urbanization are different. Actual degrees of damage and suffering of difficulties in daily life are surveyed for various urban services and facilities, and their interrelations are analyzed by a method of multivariate analysis. Relative contributions to difficulties in daily life are obtained as (1) city water is not available (0.28) (2) city gas service is not available (0.16) (3) shortage of food (0.14) (4) telephone service is not available (0.14) (5) shortage of necessities in an emergency (dry battery, candle, oil heater, medicine) (0.10) (6) electricity is not available (0.10) where numbers in ( ) represent relative intensities. It is true that they depend on various factors, e.g. availability of alternatives and time for recovery. It should be remarked that almost all alternatives are hard to obtain at an individual or family level. In addition, occurrence of casualties within a family will overwhelm other difficulties. A paralysis in telephone lines comes from the needs for personal information in the family due to separation of the members of the family in working and residential areas.
Next, systems panic is analyzed from a supply side. Each supply system has its own complex structure and further, there exist various interactions among them. To find out the vulnerability of the systems, the method of fault net analysis is employed. Let the event A be derived from B and C. If A occurs when either B or C occurs, the situation is expressed in Fig. 14 (a) . In turn, if A occurs when both B and C occur, it becomes Fig. 14 (b) . Then "water is not available" which is the most fatal event for citizens can be described by Fig. 15 , in which each box represents unit potential damage. It is seen that the event "water is not available" has a complex multi-level structure, and also that it is intimately dependent upon electricity supply system and communication system. Generally, the greater the number of OR (+) relations, the system becomes less stable. Fig. 16 (b) . Schematic representation for the case "phone service is not available".
for an earthquake of intensity 6. It is seen that the unit damage will occur at every level for intensity 6, and consequently it might be very difficult to protect the system. Similar diagrams are shown in Figs. 
(a), (b), (c), (d).
Generally the damage is classified into Type A: damage of system element (equipment) Type B: collapse of channels. Type B is more fatal at upper levels (near the top event) because the total lengths of terminal channels are long, while type A is more fatal at lower levels because the number of central equipments is small. Therefore the protection of channels and equipments is useful at upper and lower levels respectively.
Damage and countermeasures of respective service systems after warning issue are compiled in Table 18 (a) and (b). From the demand (citizen) side, maintenance of water supply is important, and therefore, the protection of water service system is essential. It should be remarked that the leak of water caused by the collapse of terminal channels is not fatal if the leaking water is available for citizens, and then the protection of filtration plant is rather important to Fig. 16(c) . Schematic representation for the case "electricity is not available". obtain high quality water.
On the other hand, the leak of city gas is dangerous.
However, to stop city gas service is difficult because a check of cocks at individual homes is required before the re-supply. So, a regulation before the earthquake occurrence is not advisable rather the automatic shut off by shocks is recommended.
Individuals cannot store electricity and city gas after the warning is issued, while the storage of water is possible. If faucets are opened at every home for emergency storage, the water pressure will be lowered before the earthquake occurrence, which would hinder fire fighting activities. Therefore, a regulation Fig. 16(d) . Schematic representation for the case "city gas is not available".
of water pressure will be necessary after the warning issue . Naturally it must be raised to the normal level when the earthquake occurs. These countermeasures will be useful to reduce the demand-supply gap described in
Main objects in the existing hazards reduction program are to reduce losses 
emergent mass evacuation, (C) fire fighting. Here, they are evaluated from the citizen's demand side. The method of fault net analysis is employed in which the main events are "relief service is not available", "regional mass evacuation is impossible" and "regional fire occurs" respectively. Structures of cause and effect networks are shown in Figs. 17(a), (b) , (c).
It is seen that these three events are intimately related to each other through traffic and communication troubles. Efficient fire fighting services cannot be expected because too many relations are involved. Difficulties in relief service, whose structure is referred to the Miyagi-Ken-Oki earthquake, come mainly from the occurrence of too many minor injuries and communication trouble. It is remarked that many of the above difficulties cannot be resolved at Fig. 17(b) . Schematic representation for the case "regional mass evacuation is impossible"
individual or family level, but administrative countermeasures are required. Extinguishing afire at its initial stage might be an only possible action at individual level. According to experience with Miyagi-Ken-Oki and other recent earthquakes at urban areas, fixing of furniture to prevent them from falling on an oil heater or oven is effective. In addition, it is remarked that most of the minor injuries are caused by the splintering of glass doors of furnitures.
Here mass evacuation is evaluated from the viewpoint of fault net analysis.
In the existing program, there exist two types of evacuation, i.e. temporary and
regional. An open space greater than 100ha is appointed to the latter for people over 10,000, while a primary school is appointed to the former for 1,000 people at a community level. When a regional fire becomes intense, movement from a temporary evacuation place to a regional one is ordered.
For an earthquake of intensity 5, regional mass evacuation will not be neces- and other materials makes a site selection more difficult, and will become less accessible to citizens. Risk of looting by riot is also increased, consuming too many police officers who could be occupied in more important duties.
In conclusion, regional evacuation will not be effectual for any earthquake. The shelter of community level with emergency information center connected with the municipality headquarters might be much more useful. Mass evacuation at the stage of warning issue will also be ineffective except for people at hospitals and other establishments for the weak, or for special areas with risks of landslide or tsunami.
"Stay at home" at the time of the earthquake will be favorable for extinguishing fires at the initial stage. Excess dispersion of police officers for issue transmission and evacuation guidance should be avoided. T: Delay time to move from A to B or from B to A (T=0, 1, P: Transition probability
The above binary relations 1, 2, 3 and 4 mean:
1. Level value at node A is transfered from node A to B depending on a specified delay time T and transition probability P.
2.
Level value of node B is transfered from node B to A depending on a specified delay time T and transition probability P.
3. Nodes A and B are synonyms.
4.
Cut relation between node A and B.
Given the set of binary relations, the overall network structure is formed automatically, and retrieval of paths and dynamic simulation are carried out. Fundamental procedures of calculation are as follows:
(1) Represent a network relational model using four kinds of binary relations.
(2) Specify a root node, of which initial time and level value are preset to 0 and 100 respectively.
(3) Starting from the specific root node, the network relational model is transformed into a tree format using an indentation method. If the loop structure is found, the trace is carried out only once, and an endless trace is avoided. (1) (A>B (T, P, phase no.)) (2) (A=B (T, P, phase no.)) where, A, B: Node name.
T: Delay time to move from node A to B. An integer value n is given.
P: Transition probability. An integer value n phase no.:
Step interval during which the relation is effective.
the simulation running using interactive commands. 20=The relation is activated only when the preset intercept step is reached. 99=The relation is activated when the level of node A exceeds the threshold or when the inflow to node A exceeds the variation. The relation should have the form: (A>X (T, P, 99)). Binary relations (1) and (2) mean: (1) Level value is transfered from node A to B depending on a specified delay time T and transition probability P. This type of binary relation is used to express "mass flow" between node A and B, where the rule of mass conservation hold:
(2) Level value of node A is copied to node B depending on a specified delay time T and transition probability P. This type of relation is used to express "information flow" between node A and B , where no rule of mass conservation hold:
Beside the structure of network model, status and initial condition of each node are specified using a node data as:
A (type, level, threshold, variation) where, type (node type): 0=no change. 1=inflow relations to A are cut if the level value of A exceeds the threshold or variation value. 2=outflow relations from A are cut if the level value of A exceeds the threshold or variation value. 3=both inflow and outflow relations are cut if the level value of A exceeds the threshold or variation value. level (state value of A):
Initial value is set as an input data. Subsequent values are generated automatically through simulation. E, F, and G mean node name which is used in binary relations. Modify data (1) and (2) (1) A pipe model (saturate type of output function) as well as a simple transition probability (linear type of output function) are employed to represent a level flow between two nodes. to awake) of binary relation is added.
(3) In order to reduce calculation errors in integer operation or rounding, a real type operation is employed to calculate the level value.
Let the relation be defined using two types of binary relations as:
(1) (A>B (T, P, phase no., TYPE)) (2) (A=B (T, P, phase no., TYPE)) where, A, B: Node name. T: Delay time to move from node A to B. An integer value n phase no.:
Step interval during which the relation is effective. (1) Level value is transfered from node A to B depending on a specified delay time T, value P and TYPE. This type of binary relation is used to express "mass flow" between node A and B , where the rule of mass conservation hold.
For the case of TYPE=1, the mass flow is calculated as follows;
For the case of TYPE=2, the mass flow from node A to node Ni is calculated as follows;
where, La, shows the level value of node A, and Pi shows the value of threshold of flux from node A to node Ni (2) Level value of node A is copied to node B depending on a specified delay time T and transition probability P. This type of relation is used to express "information flow" between node A and B, where no rule of mass conservation hold: 
VT:
Preset threshold value of inflow within the unit time increase for the decision of relation cut.
Conditional:
If one of the condition of level overflow, level underflow, and variation overflow occurs, the structure of causal relations are modified using modify data as:
